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Pricing joint use of municipal
services: Theoretical perspectives
and regulatory issues
Abstract: This paper analyses price regulation of inter-municipal contracts in Finland to
demonstrate interpretative problems of regulatory rules specifying full-cost or market prices
and, by so doing, deepen understanding of the theoretical underpinnings for pricing
collaborative municipal services. It considers how to price inter-municipal services taking
into account the specific socio-economic nature of inter-municipal cooperation, including
both financial and non-financial objectives, through a new joint-use pricing model of
municipal services that challenges the supremacy of full-cost pricing requirements in cases
of inter-municipal collaborative contracting. Acknowledging limitations and benefits, it
concludes European Single Market rules militate against municipal discretion and localism.




This study analyses pricing issues for inter-municipal contracting. It considers how to price
collaborative services and the implications of different pricing options
for financial governance. Utilizing Finnish case materials, it focuses on municipal joint use
systems, where a municipal service is at the disposal of at least two local authorities
simultaneously or consecutively. It shows that the economic principles of the European
Single Market (ESM) are inconsistent with both Nordic countr  municipal
autonomy and the European Charter of Local Self-Government
democracy (ECLSG, 1985).
The European Union (EU) has sought to create and promote the realization of the ESM by
abolishing trade barriers on goods and services in member states and instituting a
transparent competitive system of public procurement (Bovis, 2013). However, non-tariff
obstacles to trade have proved difficult to remove, various bureaucratic or discriminatory
governance practices against outsourcing provision of public services to the private and
third sectors being justified on special grounds (Hansson & Holmgren, 2011).
In Finland, attempts to justify such non-conforming practices generally refer to the
decentralist principles promulgated by the Council of Europe to propagate local democracy
(ECLSG 1985, Stivachtis & Habegger, 2011). Fostering the regulation and management of
a substantial share of public affairs by municipalities themselves through localism seems to
conflict with EU-wide regulation.
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Nordic countries have an administrative tradition of relatively strong local autonomy
allowing municipalities to choose whether they want to produce their services via their own
(i.e. in-house) organization or municipal collaboration. Elsewhere in the EU, inter-
municipal collaboration is also widespread and has many operative models (Hults & van
Montfort, 2011). This can be regarded as closed outsourcing because it blocks supply of
public services by private law organizations and so militates against a consistent ESM
regulatory framework.
Previous studies of the regulation of public procurements and inter-municipal contracting
demonstrated legal uncertainties regarding the grounds on which municipalities may sign
inter-municipal contracts without following EU public procurement rules (Burgi & Koch,
2012). Baciu & Dragos (2015) reported inconsistent practices in member states related to
under what conditions municipalities engage in horizontal inter-municipal transactions and
there was evidence of an increasingly flexible interpretation for the scope for inter-
municipal contracting (Clarke, 2015). There is no obligation to apply public procurement
regulation if inter-municipal contracting delivers local public services in a co-operative
manner and the contract does not involve remuneration.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to these discussions about how well grounded or
functional are the public procurement regulations providing rules for horizontal inter-
municipal transactions and how to improve regulatory reasoning from the perspective of
financial management. Accordingly, we consider the issues of joint use contracts relating to
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the specific socio-economic nature of inter-municipal cooperation, including both financial
and non-financial objectives.
Our study analyses how the pricing settings of collaborative inter-municipal contracting are
regulated in Finland in order to highlight the interpretative problems of top-down price
control of municipal joint use services and deepen understanding about the theoretical
underpinnings of pricing inter-municipal services. Our purpose is to demonstrate how the
issues of capacity utilization and the relationship between contracting municipalities are
overlooked by the current price regulation and so we argue the case for a new pricing
model for joint use of municipal services.
Pricing intra-organizational contracts can use cost-based, market-based, negotiated or dual
prices. Cost-based and market-based prices are the most popular transfer pricing methods
for the internal pricing of goods and services moving between corporate divisions in private
sector companies (Cravens, 1997; Tang, 1992). Our study also analyses full cost and
market-based pricing methods but within the public sector to highlight the influence of
regulatory policies on alternative pricing methods and their financial governance from the
perspectives of public administration, law, economics, and accounting.
The pure pricing problem of inter-municipal contracting is universal but how to regulate
prices or pricing methods is an economic region or country specific issue. EU directives
and European Court of Justice (ECJ) cases constitute a comprehensive legislative
framework limiting regulatory leeway for member states. Nevertheless, the wording of
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European statutes create remarkable legal uncertainties for public-public collaboration and
so are subject to various interpretations by member states (Hausmann & Queisner, 2013).
Our study of the Finnish case demonstrates how the loose legal statutes of inter-municipal
co-operation leave unresolved the demarcation between joint use of services as part of
municipal public administration based on democratic self-government and public
procurements as part of the ESM. It also demonstrates how this lack of resolution creates
governance problems in municipal financial management and so contributes to the
tightening of state regulation of the pricing decisions of local governments. Furthermore,
the conceptual analysis reveals the weaknesses of the key cost and price terms used by
courts and lawmakers in their efforts to regulate pricing of inter-municipal services. This
analysis is relevant not only for Finland but also for the rest of the EU and elsewhere.
METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE
The paper proceeds by explaining our research data and methodology, thereafter
considering the wider theoretical foundations of contractual public service delivery via
agency theory within a quasi-market framework. Regulatory differences between inter-
municipal co-operation and local public procurements are then summarized to demonstrate
recently introduced judicial pricing requirements for contractual municipal services.
Analysis of the regulatory foundations of joint use systems and pricing requirements
utilizes documentary reviews of Finnish legislation, law drafting materials and selected
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legal judgements of court cases complemented by a summarized review of European legal
court cases.
After highlighting the emergence of full cost pricing and market pricing rules, we
problematize regulatory requirements by explicating interpretative ambiguities, considering
how those requirements could be understood and implemented by assessing the
intelligibility of legal terms and through critical appraisal of the ambiguous presumptions
regarding the availability and robustness of the data required for economic decision making
in municipalities.
A new pricing model is then developed as follows. First, we develop new theoretical
perspectives of pricing inter-municipal services by considering the justification of
economic cost concepts and by recombining some related elements of agency theory,
pricing theories and quasi-market theory. Second, we create a two-dimensional matrix of
four different methods of pricing taking account of the mode of joint contracting and
utilization of service capacity. Although tentative and instrumentalist, the conceptual model
is shown to promote socio-economic efficiency within public-public collaboration,
demonstrating what form of pricing is justifiable and providing a constructive framework
for drafting laws and guidance. The discussion section provides a summary of findings and
arguments, makes clear their theoretical and regulatory relevance and considers the
implications and limitations of our analysis and pricing model. Finally, we provide a short
concluding section summarizing the origin of the regulatory pricing problem and
crystallizing our case for a new pricing doctrine.
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THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES FOR COLLABORATIVE CONTRACTING
Agency theory has been used to analyze contractual assignments and contractual
buyer/supplier relationship (Murray, 2009). Following agency theory, a local government
may act as a principal and hire an agent to operate as a collaborative party and produce
specified public services. The principal selects a suitable agent that can be another local
authority or a private organization and signs the service contract. The service delivery agent
can be considered a contractor of the local government (Lane, 1997).
The ESM regime requires competitive tendering for collaborative contracts whereas some
municipalities may prefer negotiation-based relationships with other municipalities based
on familiarity, trust and straightforwardness. Applying the theory of collaborative
advantage (Huxam, 2003), inter-municipal collaboration may increase communication
between neighboring municipal policy makers; improve shared understanding about sub-
regional problems and spillovers and thereby create potential for synergy from working
collaboratively; provide a solution to the problem of regional free riders; deliver benefits
which cannot be achieved by either of the collaborative municipalities acting alone; and
avoid the need to make radical administrative reforms such as the creation of joint
organizations or municipal amalgamations. On the other hand, inter-municipal contracting
may be inhibited, suffer, or fail due to collaborative inertia, which may arise from opposite
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interests, lack of trust, inconsistent regulatory framework, and lack of incentives for
effective operations / lack of cost control mechanisms.
Agency theory emphasizes that principal and agent have different goals and incompatible
attitudes towards risks and that contracting happens in a situation of asymmetric
information. The principal faces considerable uncertainty because of limited knowledge
about the qualities and potential of the agent and because the agent may manipulate
information which it provides to the principal as it tries to organize cost-effective
supervision of the reporting arrangements and auditing
(Eisenhardt, 1989).
The ESM requirement of competitive tendering for contracts may also create a quasi-
market, this being a regulated institutional framework where public and private sector
service organizations compete for public service contracts. A quasi-market framework
represents a hybrid form of governance including regulated imitations of market
mechanisms and business-like contracting processes (Hurri et al. 2016).
Although compulsory competitive tendering, the purchaser-provider split, contract
requirements, and other aspects of contract governance are expected to improve economic
efficiency of public service delivery (Dowding & John, 2009), the legally stipulated
procurement practices or administratively designed market-like settings may themselves
cause problems. First, regulated organizations may oppose rules or observe them only in a
ritualistic way. Second, regulation may cause performance ambiguities since it can be
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difficult to specify meaningful or appropriate courses of action. Third, all parties may have
difficulty obtaining suitable data in order to confirm the appropriateness and lawfulness of
actions (Ashworth, Boyne, & Walker, 2002).
ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS
Contracts for municipal joint use services can be considered public procurement contracts
or municipal administrative contracts. The key principles for the governance of public
procurements within the ESM are open competitive tendering, neutrality, non-
discrimination, and transparency in selection criteria and decision-making. The processes of
the calls for bids, bidding, and the comparison of bids are precisely stipulated. The
procurement rules provide options for parties to seek redress for the prevention of
corruption and misconduct (Arlbjørn & Freytag, 2012). The legal framework of public
procurements is exhaustive, providing very detailed rules regarding what kind of phases
and policies a procurement procedure managed by a public authority must include.
The statutes relating to administrative contracting are much more limited and liberal and
less prescriptive than for public procurements in the ESM, giving municipalities more
degrees of freedom when planning, negotiating, selecting, and renewing service contracts.
Municipalities are not required to call for bids from the private sector since they are free to
select municipal partners with whom to cooperate as they wish.
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Although the differences between public procurement contracts and municipal
administrative contracts clearly lies in the conditions for their preparation and
implementation, there have been considerable judicial and administrative uncertainties
among municipal managers and councilors regarding the regulatory grounds on which they
may buy or acquire services from another municipality and the types of contractual
stipulations available (Hausmann & Queisner, 2013).
If a municipality chooses administrative contracting in situations where it should have used
procurement contracting, private (i.e. non-contracting and external) service organizations
may challenge the joint use service system by complaining to the market court and
municipalities may end up in long and undesirable litigation processes with negative
publicity.
PRICING REQUIREMENTS OF INTER-MUNICIPAL SERVICES
The pricing requirement set by the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
A study of legal cases of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) considered exceptions to the
judicial requirement to apply procurement rules to municipal contracting, concluding that
municipalities are allowed to adopt inter-municipal co-operation outside the ESM and
procurement framework if five conditions hold simultaneously (Baciu & Dragos, 2015).
These are that the contract is signed exclusively between public authorities, the contractual
relation is aimed to ensure the delivery of a public duty of the contracting parties, it
excludes private capital, it is based on a genuine cooperation with the public interest in
Pricing joint 11
mind, and the contract implies no profits. The non-profit condition has been applied in the
ECJ cases allowing reimbursement of costs incurred in providing the service as long as
commercial purposes are excluded from the contract (Baciu & Dragos, 2015; Hausmann &
Queisner, 2013; Panagopoulos & Partners, 2011).
The pricing requirement set in Finnish legal praxis
Finnish courts have recently developed principles for pricing the contracts of joint use
services outside the rules of public procurements. The city of Hanko agreed a co-operative
contract for joint use of ambulances owned by the city of Espoo, the former paying the
latter a fixed annual charge. Both cities regarded this joint-use system of municipal services
to be consistent with the framework of municipal co-operation promulgated by the Finnish
Municipality Act (365/1995). However, a private ambulance operator challenged the
contract in the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court. The Court judged that the two
municipalities had agreed a commercial contract because the fixed contract price gave the
city of Espoo an opportunity to generate profits and entailed risks without creation of any
joint body or collaborative governance arrangements (KHO 2004:102). The Court therefore
concluded that the joint use contract was not a collaborative contract in terms of the Finnish
Municipality Act (365/1995) and should therefore have taken the form of a public
procurement subject to competitive bidding.
In a subsequent case (KHO 2011:24) the Court concluded that inter-municipal contracting
in the framework of the Municipal Act (365/1995) should be based on long-term
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commitments and solidarity, overriding short-term commercial considerations. Unlike
conventional procurement contracts, whose pricing follows principles of commercial
profitability, municipalities should share the cost and exclude possibilities for profit making
when pricing pure inter-municipal contracts. In the 2011 case municipalities had decided to
jointly use ambulances based on full-cost prices and so the Court determined that it was a
classic inter-municipal (i.e. administrative) service contract because the purchasing
authority could not make profits and could avoid economic risks typical in open market
transactions.
From these two cases, it seems that if municipalities wish to implement a joint use system
based on administrative contracting (i.e. not be subject to public procurement legislation),
they must adopt full cost pricing in order to be risk free and enter into governance
arrangements characterized by long-term commitment and municipal solidarity.
It is notable that, in reaching its judgement, the Court did not consider the nature and
capacity of the joint-use service and the wider collaborative contexts of contracting
municipalities, for example, whether their collaborative relationship was reciprocal or one-
sided.
The new legislative pricing requirement
The 1995 Municipality Act did not prescribe how local governments should price their
service offerings for negotiated or competitive contracts and so it needed clarification. A
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2013 reform now requires local governments to corporatize municipal services sold on the
open market (the Finnish Municipality Act [410/2015]). Corporatization entails
abandonment of the municipal form of organization to create a company under private law
that is owned by the local government(s) but which is given legal capacity to be
managerially and financially independent (Valkama, 2013). As a new private law-based
legal entity, an inter-municipal joint venture or co-operative (i.e. corporation) faces the
possibility of insolvency and there is no consequent need to regulate its pricing practices.
However, the New Municipality Act (410/2015) still allows municipalities to sign some
short term market-based contracts (i.e. sell services to external parties) without having to
corporatize services, for example to sell surplus service capacity by utilizing a market-
based pricing method (HE, 2013). These regulatory rules mean that if a local government
provides (i.e. sells) joint-use services to other local governments or any other organizations
via public procurement it must follow market prices to make sure that local governments
cannot distort market competition (HE, 2013).
PROBLEMS RELATING TO PRICING REQUIREMENTS
Pricing options and methods for public services
Prices of public services can be set so as to recover more than full costs in order to generate
a cash surplus or to reach a target rate of return, to only break-even, or to recover less than
full cost thereby resulting in a loss or deficit meaning that the service must be subsidized
from other revenues. Figure 1 demonstrates how fundamental pricing principles or
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approaches relate to more specific pricing methods (see Table 1). The solid line in Figure 1
illustrates the axiomatic relationships between the categories and methods and the broken
line illustrates the pricing methods consistent with either surpluses, full costs, or deficits.
PRICING OPTIONS FOR
PUBLIC SERVICES
MORE THAN FULL COSTS LESS THAN FULL COSTS
Market pricing










Recovery of total cost
Figure 1. Pricing approaches and methods for public services (Valkama 2006).




1) More than full cost a) Return on investment pricing Price is set to achieve a target rate of
return on capital employed
b) Full cost plus pricing A mark-up is added to the full cost price
2) Full cost Recovery of total cost Recovers running and capital costs (i.e.
accounting costs) but not opportunity
costs (i.e. what service resources could
earn if put to alternative uses)
3) Less than full costs Marginal cost pricing Marginal cost refers to the cost of
increasing the rate of service output
Less than marginal cost pricing Recovers only short-run marginal (i.e.
operating costs) costs, not long-run
marginal costs, the latter being greater
than the former by an amount equal to the
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future cost of renewing the capital
infrastructure when it becomes
economically obsolete.
Nominal price The price is purely symbolic, being
minimal and not seeking to recover costs
Zero price The service is free at the point of
consumption
All the above pricing
principles (1, 2, 3)
Market pricing Price  is  set  according  to  that  charged  by
other organizations in the market so that it
is competitive.
Value added pricing
valuation of the service (revealed by
willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-
accept evaluation methods)
Sources: nitis & Indounas, 2005; Jones & Pendlebury, 2000; Williamson, 1996;
Department of Treasury and Finance, 2007.
Problems relating to full-cost pricing
Full-cost pricing refers to selling services at a price equal to what it costs to produce them,
i.e. the client is billed for all the direct costs (i.e. front-line costs) and the indirect costs (i.e.
the appropriate portion of overheads) (Local Government Association of South Australia,
2013; Sipilä, 2003). Full-cost pricing is widely applied in public policies and public law-
based regulation (Groot & Budding, 2004; Harmon, 2015; Coller & Collini, 2015).
It may sound a neutral (i.e. not normative) and straightforward concept but there is no well-
established full cost th
Although conceptually clear, the calculated amount of full costs depends crucially on
accounting methods used in its calculation and especially on how to allocate indirect costs
on final service products or performances. Inter alia, it is not clear whether accounting for
the depreciation of the value of capital assets used in production of the service should be
calculated on the basis of historic or current (i.e. replacement) costs, the latter being less
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certain than the former (Fog, 1994; Jones & Pendlebury, 2000). This and other classic
problems of management accounting are noted in Table 2.
Table 2. Alternative ways to value and allocate costs.
Questions Prime options
On what cost basis should depreciation of service
assets be calculated?
Historic cost; current cost (e.g. fair value);
replacement cost; opportunity costs
Which method of depreciation should be used? Straight line; reducing balance; sum of years' digits;
units of activity
How should inventories (i.e. stored goods) be
valued?
Specific identification; first-in, first-out (FIFO);
last-in, first-out (LIFO); weighted average
How should capital cost be calculated? Market rates; administrative rates
How should overhead costs be allocated? Job order costing; activity-based-costing;
departmental costing
Sources: Ellwood, 1996; Arrunada, 2001.
Contrary to some other EU countries, there is no regulation of the methods of municipal
management accounting in Finland. Municipalities can instigate self-government by
managing their internal systems of cost accounting, how they formulate the structures of
cost centers and define cost categories (Raulinajtys-Grzybek, 2014).
The Finnish Supreme Administrative Court (KHO, 2011:24) -cost
, causing confusion by implying only those costs borne by the local government
and so diverging, perhaps significantly, from full costs  where the latter is funded by other
stakeholders via intergovernmental grants, investment subsidies, sponsorship, donations
and bequests etc.
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Full-cost pricing regulation has drawbacks. First, it excludes dynamic price setting from
contract negotiations and sp -size-fits-
(Allen & Petsoulas, 2016). Second, it does not provide an effective governance framework
for rational decision making as there are no effective incentives to minimize costs. Thirdly,
the service producer municipality no longer has full control over demand-led running costs
as it responds to changes in service take-up in the other joint-use municipality and the
service may become economically obsolete due to changes in (say, educational and
medical) technology (Bartlett et al., 2004).
Problems with market-based pricing
Market-based pricing reflects the going market rate for the service. Finnish government
guidance is that municipalities have to apply the same prices as private organizations (HE,
2013). The aim of the market-price requirement is to make sure that there is
-administrative transactions (HE, 2013;
Virtanen & Valkama, 2009).
Problems relating to the gaps in data are very different with market-based pricing
regulation compared with the requirements of full-cost pricing. Regulated organizations
(i.e. municipalities) do not produce market price data and so it is sometimes difficult for
individual service organizations to determine .
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Figure  2
conceptually vague and virtually oscillatory (Swedberg, 2003). It can refer variously to
co s  list prices, most recent bid prices received and prices
negotiated within markets characterized by monopoly power (Eccles, 1985; Vancil, 1978).



































Published price lists often do not take account of quality of service. Moreover, not all prices
appear in published lists. In practice, prices are often discounted, contracted-for and
modified subsequent to service delivery in the form of finalized prices. Furthermore, levels
of competition vary on a geographical basis when there are many more suppliers in some
regions than in others. These factors increase municipalities  search costs when they seek to
determine prices for their services, particularly for professional and statutory municipal
services compared with non-professional and voluntary services information (Williamson,
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1996). However, in cases of asymmetric information, the requirement of market pricing is
more neutral towards both the principal and agent than the requirement of full-cost prices.
Rather than being truly competitive, market prices may be set by private profit-making
 or for services characterized by monopoly
power arising from there being only one supplier (monopoly) or several colluding
(oligopoly). There can be little if any justification for municipalities being required to copy
exploitative prices set to generate monopoly profits.
The fundamental problem of the market pricing requirement is that it effectively makes
redundant governance of cost accounting for pricing purposes because municipalities have
to determine the price within the open market, thus becoming price takers .  It  can  be
argued that while the pricing requirement clearly promotes a t happens
at the cost of constraining the competition dynamics within markets, as local governments
cannot develop their own pricing policies.
THEORIZING AND MODELING PRICING OF INTER-MUNICIPAL SERVICES
New theoretical perspectives for pricing inter-municipal services
The pure economic theory of pricing is that sales in the current period are economically
justifiable as long as their short run marginal cost (SRMC) is fully recovered by the
revenue generated by those sales (Abelson, 2002). For that trade to continue over
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subsequent years the price must cover long run marginal cost (LRMC), which is greater
than SRMC by the amount of depreciation of capital assets and so those additional revenues
can ultimately be used to finance replacement of the physical infrastructure used to provide
the output when it is worn out.
This pricing rule is consistent with the assumption that trading is aimed at maximisation of
profits, the intention of private sector enterprises being to charge as much as the market will
bear so that price not just equals LRMC but exceeds it in order to generate profits and so
pay dividends to shareholders and other owners of those companies.
In the case of inter-municipal services, however, the working rule is full operational (i.e.
running) and capital cost recovery (i.e. of LRMC), price therefore not generating profits
but, instead, revenues above SRMC being reinvested in service continuity and
improvement. Put another way, this non-profit pricing rule is meant to recover costs over a
run of years, that being the rule for so-called trading services in the UK local government
sector (Bailey, 2010).
The prohibition of profit maximization in Finnish inter-municipal services apparently aims
to pursue a broader set of objectives, both financial and non-financial. Financial objectives
are to cover full costs. Non-financial objectives relate to inter-municipal cooperation in
order to provide services not otherwise sustainable if provided separately by local
authorities for use only within their own jurisdictions. Inter-municipal joint-use services
therefore benefit both contracting partners and so the economic theory of profit maximising
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pricing is not relevant in this case. The profit objective has to be replaced with a value for
money (VFM) pricing rule. However, this VFM concept is broader than the so-called 3Es
of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. It also has to incorporate consideration of equity
(a fourth E), but where equity applies to both of the contract partners rather than to
individual service users.
This new and broader conceptualization of inter-municipal equity requires a modified
fourth E. It means that the authority buying the service from the provider municipality must
only be expected to fully cover SRMC and make some (less than 100%) contribution to
LRMC, the difference being covered by the local authority producing the service because
its citizens also use that service.
Each local government fully covers SRMC, price paying for the day-to-day running (i.e.
non-capital) costs of service provision, including wages and salaries of service employees,
rents and insurances for service premises and their maintenance (but not replacement) costs
etc. The sharing of capital costs (i.e. LRMC) covered by the recipient and provider
municipalities is determined not only by a sense of equity in the sharing of those long-term
(i.e. infrastructure replacement) costs but also by broader objectives relating to the
perceived benefits of inter-municipal cooperation. These include its stimulation of
community development beyond the geographic boundaries of individual local
governments and the preservation of the desired range of public services at local
community level, so precluding their transfer to much larger-scale and more remote
regional governments or even national government.
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Accordingly, there is no attempt by the provider municipality to take advantage of its sub-
regional monopoly position to raise the contracting price above LRMC. Hence, the
economic model of monopoly pricing does not apply in this case. There not being a highly
competitive market for this inter-municipal service means that the profit maximizing
pricing rule of the perfect competition market model also does not apply. That rule requires
the price (determined by the market, not set by the producer) to equal the cost of
incremental production (i.e. marginal revenue equals marginal cost).
Hence, these modified propositions of (non-profit) pricing can be applied to quasi-
marketized (i.e. partly-marketised) inter-municipal trading which, besides seeking full-
current-cost recovery immediately, also seeks to promote sustainability of capital
investments with sub-regional welfare gains. This is a form of cost-benefit analysis (CBA)
and is a broader form of VFM than that based on the 3Es considered in the 'new public
management' literature. Consideration of the fourth E (equity) extends to the inter-
municipal level.
Although developed only on the Finnish case studies presented in this paper, these
theoretical propositions for inter-municipal pricing can be further developed during the
current public sector austerity era. Local governments in many European countries seek to
reduce and share the costs of services (not just so-called back-office but also front-line
services) and so need a pricing model in order to do so.
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A new pricing model of municipal joint use services
According to the theory of perfect competition, prices are economically optimal if they
satisfy one of the following two (mutually exclusive) conditions. First, when they equal
LRMC of supply in the case of perfect competition. Second, when each service user is
charged the maximum amount he or she is willing to pay for a service supplied by a
monopoly provider, with the result that the marginal (i.e. incremental) benefit of service
consumption equals marginal revenue (i.e. price). The latter case is rice
because the price set by the monopoly provider discriminates between
individual service users in direct relation to their willingness to pay for that service, this
term being used in Figure 2 (Lepage, 1991; Arrunada, 2001).
However, as made clear above, market prices may not be economically optimal because,
even if accurate cost data (including for depreciation and overheads) were available, some
pricing methods do not make use of LRMC either explicitly or implicitly (see Table 1).
Moreover, it is even more difficult to determine the benefit (referred to as value added in
Figure 1 and Table 1) of service use (whether to the individual user or community) than to
determine the costs of producing services. Measurement of benefit makes use of
willingness-to-pay and/or willingness-to-accept evaluation methods but they often yield
very different measures. For example, willingness to pay for an extra amount of service
may be much less than the payment service users would be willing to accept as
compensation for an equivalent reduction in service they already receive.
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Irrespective of these methodological problems, the policy and practices of pricing have to
be pragmatic and, whichever pricing rule is adopted, managerial decisions should be guided
by the prices actually paid for procured services.  Bearing these points in mind, this section
develops a new pricing model for joint use of municipal services, which can be used as a
conceptual tool in order to develop the legal pricing requirements of administrative (i.e.
negotiation based) contracting.
First, the municipality considering acquiring joint-use services could compare the price of
those procured services with what it would cost to provide the service itself (Bergdahl,
1994). Similarly, the producer municipality should consider whether to sell its surplus
productive assets and do so if their sale earns more than retaining them to produce and sell
the service. These options need to be augmented to incorporate the risks associated with
those decisions. For example, the estimates of future costs and revenues may be subject to
wide margins of error as market conditions change on both the supply and demand sides of
the service in question.
Free and nearly free joint-use services can only be justified when the producer
municipality, for some particularly pressing reason, wishes to encourage another
municipality to engage in joint use of services. This could be to achieve economies of scale
and/or scope through which the producer municipality can achieve such substantial
improvements in both output and outcome effectiveness that the benefits far outweigh the
costs. In practice, such situations are extremely uncommon, possible examples being
rehabilitation services for offenders and users of illegal narcotics that reduce the incidences
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of crime and use of hard drugs across all municipalities within a region, thereby reducing
demand on prison, medical and other remedial services whose costs are borne by the
municipality producing the (nearly) free rehabilitation service.
The pricing model outlined here could replace the legal requirement for full-cost pricing.
The former depends upon the nature of the joint use relationship and the utilization of
service capacity presented in Figure 3.
The right-hand side of Figure 3 depicts the pricing options for a purchaser-provider
collaboration where the production of service is one-sided.  Price is set relative to LRMC if
there is spare service capacity.  For example, a mobile library owned by one local authority
provides services to the residents of another local authority, the latter paying appropriate
(i.e. fair) proportions of vehicle running and maintenance costs, salary costs and capital
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Figure 3. A new pricing model for joint use services.
The rationale for the pricing model to depend upon the degree of utilization of service
capacity is that there is no need to ration supply via a price if there is surplus service
capacity and so price need only cover LRMC to be consistent with the wellbeing criteria
just considered.
There are two possible complications of this pricing rule. First, capacity (and depreciation)
will typically relate to many different assets not merely one major investment. Second,
some variable costs may increase in steps rather than being perfectly divisible, for example
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labour and materials respectively. Except for - -
variable cost only available in chunks (i.e. a newly contracted full-time employee). Zero-
hours contracts are typically used by organizations to hire unskilled workers with no
guaranteed hours (e.g. sales assistants and couriers) and whose costs are therefore perfectly
divisible. In contrast, skilled/knowledge workers are usually recruited on contracts with
guaranteed hours (e.g. 40 hours per week, 52 weeks per year) and so their costs are not
perfectly divisible. In the latter (but not former) case, SRMC is stepped. These two
complications require agreement between both municipalities about the proportions of
multiple assets and chunks of labour costs that have to be covered by price.
Bearing these caveats in mind, if service capacity becomes fully utilized the price must be
set above LRMC so as to earn a cash surplus or target rate of return on capital employed
(i.e. profit), as depicted in Figure 3. That profit is necessary to finance building additional
production capacity with which to supply the purchaser municipality. Moreover, the
associated increase in fixed costs entails long-term commitment and risk taking on the part
of the provider municipality and, ultimately, by its citizens. A private sector enterprise
seeks profit and the higher the risk the greater the required rate of return on capital
employed necessary to compensate for risk taking. Municipalities, however, are not profit-
seeking commercial organizations: they do not seek profit for its own sake. Instead, their
responsibility is to fulfill their locally decided and legally imposed (i.e. statutory) duties
and promote the public interest. For that reason, the provider municipality should only
invest in services that promote the wellbeing of its citizens. This investment decision rule is
also consistent with subsidizing the purchaser authority (i.e. setting price below LRMC)
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when there are wider benefits at the regional scale which also benefit citizens in the
purchaser authority, the hard drugs and crime examples noted above. In economics-speak,
this pricing and investment decision rule promotes achievement of allocative efficiency
(Bailey, 1999).
Rather than a one-sided relationship, municipalities may have a reciprocal (i.e. mutual)
relationship represented by the left-hand side of Figure 3. Then price may be set only to
cover SRMC when service capacity is partially utilized and full accounting costs when
fully utilized. In neither case is there any addition to price to compensate the provider
municipality for the risk it incurs when building additional service capacity with which to
supply the purchaser municipality.
An example relating specifically to costs would be a city municipality offering care
services for children and adults in an adjacent authority in order to achieve economies of
scale and scope for the same service within its own boundaries. The four costing cells in
Figure 3 provide the approach to pricing in the four service scenarios to which those cells
relate. Higher-level management costs are indivisible and so should be accounted for and
priced separately from the costs of individual service units (i.e. residential care homes and
day care centres). Prices should then be set for services provided by the separate service
units, ideally organized as cost centres (Bailey et al., 1993), taking account of utilization of
capacity in each. Less than full costs (here SRMC) would be charged if there is spare
capacity and the demand for care services is expected to fall in the future. Full costs (here
LRMC) would be charged if there is no spare capacity and the demand for care services is
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not expected to change in the near future. More than full costs (here LRMC plus a target
return on capital) would be charged if there is no spare capacity and the demand for care
services is expected to rise in the future due to an ageing demography and/or more single
elderly adult households.
Some municipalities may hesitate to engage in joint use contracts, for example if cost
structures are very different for mutually contracted services (e.g. labor-intensive front-
office services versus capital-intensive back-office services). In these cases, the
acceptability of the joint use contracts and their pricing model may be improved by
agreeing the duration of contracts and to rotate joint use services periodically.
It is arguable that municipal investments already made should not be included in the
calculation of the costs of joint-
irreversible public investments occur whether or not a joint use agreement is implemented
(Lyon & Mayo, 2005). Nevertheless, especially in one-sided cases of fully used capacity,
new physical infrastructures or facilities (e.g. school buildings) provide the service to
another municipality and are subject to wear and tear (i.e. depreciation) and will ultimately
need to be replaced. Hence, the more the use of new capacity is facilitated by the old
capacity, the higher share of its sunk costs should be included in the cost base.
DISCUSSION
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Our study is not an empirical review of how different pricing methods are applied and so it
does not present municipal data. Such data may have little value for analysis because it is
unrealistic to expect to find anything other than data demonstrating that municipalities
apply full cost prices. This is because, according to current regulations and legal
interpretations, other pricing methods are (probably) not legal in administrative contracting.
It is not within the remit of the paper to identify illegal practices. Moreover, although
having empirical data demonstrates what municipalities do, it is not necessary to consider
what might be an appropriate way of pricing because that consideration is based on ESM
and ECJ rules. Instead, this study prompts regulators and municipalities to consider more
fundamentally the nature of inter-municipal service charges.
It is arguable that agency theory helps understand and explain typical municipal-private
(i.e. public procurement) contracting based either on negotiations or on competitive
tendering. Municipalities and private enterprises are fundamentally different kinds of
organizational forms, which emphasizes institutional gaps between abilities to respond to
and bear risks. Their inherent orientation to information capture on pricing issues is
fundamentally different. Enterprises focus on formulating competitive price setting
strategies whereas the local government sector rarely considers alternative costing methods
and pricing strategies as most public services are provided to their users and citizens free of
charge and, more fundamentally, public services are sometimes considered too
unquantifiable or heterogeneous for accurate cost accounting (van Helden, 1997).
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We argue that agency theory lacks the same conceptual functionality in cases of the
reciprocal joint use of municipal services since local governments operate within the same
risk frameworks and concepts, taking commercial risks only for the special legal category
of trading services operating within competitive markets. Their ability to bear risks is the
same in legal terms in that they are all subject to the same local government legislation but,
otherwise, differences in their financial resources (positively related to size of municipality)
cause variation in their actual risk-bearing capacity.  It is also arguable that collaborative
municipalities  preconditions minimize the problems of asymmetric information on cost
accounting within their mutual relationships since they share the same public governance,
regulatory and guidance frameworks of local public financial management.
Quasi-market-based regimes may be appropriate where the largest municipality within a
cooperating group produces the service that the smaller municipalities consume. This is
because the smaller municipalities are only marginally involved in the governance of the
producing unit, if at all, and they could conceivably buy service provision from other
providers. Otherwise, in a network of relatively more equal municipalities, our analysis and
suggestions for regulatory regimes would seem more appropriate.
Table 3 provides a comparative summary of how inter-municipal contracting is perceived
from agency and partnership perspectives. We argue that conventional (i.e., administrative)
joint use systems of municipal services need to be understood as a partnership arrangement,
where equally competent and functional contracting parties are able to sustain a higher trust
(Johansson & Siverbo, 2011). Collaborative joint use systems between alike public law
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organizations and democratic partners operating on the basis of equal financial operating
rules (i.e. not-for-profit) promote social learning of local communities through contracts.
This allows specifications of service needs and mutual co-operation to evolve in tandem in
different sectors of local public services due to the democratic participation of local citizens
(Vincent-Jones, 2013).












Different goals For the most part the same goals
Duration of contract Fixed- and short-term Long-term or possibly not fixed-term
(i.e., modus vivendi)
Renewal of contract At regular intervals according to
the public procurement rules
According to mutual agreement




Public procurement Public law relationship based on an




Minimizing operative efforts and
maximizing financial return by the
contractor municipality (i.e., the
provider of a joint use service) and
maximizing service value by the
consumer municipality while
minimizing its financial costs
Stimulating sub-regional developments,
providing services not otherwise
sustainable as a single authority service,
and/or preserving the desired range of
public services at local community level
through  municipal solidarity and social
learning in the framework of the 4Es




Typically, the principal supervises
its contractor to ensure the latter
fulfils the terms of the contract.
Shared governance and control
mechanisms (for example through a joint
governance body)
Role / function of
prices
Prices are products of a market
mechanism and, in theory,
accomplish market equilibrium
Essentially prices are the signals of risks
associated with the service capacity and
the convergence of mutuality between
contracting municipalities
Idealistic aim of pricing
decisions
Profit maximization Full operative cost recovery of LRMC
Pricing methods / Pricing method: Market prices Pricing approach: fit-for-context pricing,
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approaches which may result in prices higher, equal
to or below full costs
services less of an autonomous local political decision. Increasingly, decisions are
constrained by legal requirements developed through legal precedent requiring
municipalities to apply full cost prices in administrative (i.e. closed) inter-municipal
contracts.  However, it can be argued that it is too simplistic to believe that the ideology of
non-commercial (i.e. pure administrative) contracting is perfectly fulfilled by full cost
prices. Although full cost pricing apparently eliminates the risks of inter-municipal
transactions, it cannot eliminate operational and financial risks associated with borrowing
money, making investments in physical infrastructures and maintaining public service
facilities. A public service does not necessarily need to be free nor require fixed prices.
Service charges may vary depending on the impacts of user behavior on production costs.
Furthermore, some public authorities use multidimensional pricing mechanisms for internal
rents and internal invoicing. The major limitation of the full-cost pricing requirement is that
it is empty of context, formalistic, and imposed top-down.
also developed its new statute requiring local governments to adopt
market-based prices and short-term contracts when they sell their service capacity to
external organizations. However, this paper
term because market prices are dynamic and change during market processes and they are
variable regionally and locally. Difficulties in determining market prices and justifying
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those they adopt, means that municipalities have reason to expect further specification and
criteria from lawmakers or supervisory bodies.
There is a rationale to replace the full-cost pricing requirement with our two-dimensional
pricing model which demonstrates that optimal pricing of joint use services is contingent
upon factors associated with utilization of service capacity and the mode of contractual
arrangements. It makes clear the need to take account of service arrangements, whether
one-sided or mutual and whether the service is at full or less than full capacity.
Theoretically, a non-provider municipality jointly using services with a provider
municipality should only fully cover SRMC and make only a partial contribution to LRMC,
the equitable sharing of these capital costs being with reference to broader objectives
relating to the perceived benefits of inter-municipal cooperation. These benefits include
stimulation of further community development beyond the geographic boundaries of
individual local governments and the preservation of the desired range of public services at
local community level, thereby precluding their transfer to much larger-scale and more
remote regional or national government. The new pricing model demonstrates what costs to
consider in each of the resulting four service scenarios in Figure 3 and how joint-use prices
should be set. Nevertheless, it has some limitations.
First, the model does not resolve the data deficiency shared with the full-cost pricing
requirement nor asymmetric information. Second, economic costs terms are not necessarily
easy to apply within the cost accounting systems normally used, some costs being neither
purely variable nor fixed. Third, the model does not take into account the contractability of
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services, the less contractable they are, the more there will be a need for coordination
through mechanisms other than markets or quasi-markets. Fourth,
in public services in that they increase in lumps rather than being the perfectly divisible
costs required by the marginal cost rules. Fifth, service capacity (and depreciation)
inevitably relates to a range of assets (rather than a single major investment), some of
which will be at full capacity but not others and so there are mixed capacity issues that
complicate the conceptual simplicity of the new pricing model for joint use services in
Figure 3 above. Because of these limitations, the model provides a broad guidance
framework rather than detailed pricing and accounting rules.
The previous jurisprudential literature referring to financial issues focused on descriptions
of regulatory-compliant pricing methods (e.g., Janssen, 2014; Burgi & Koch, 2012;
Panagopoulos & Partners, 2011). Our new pricing model challenges those dominant
judicial pricing considerations and shows how to develop and prioritize alternative
approaches to pricing. Ultimately, the pricing model militates against performance
ambiguities by providing an avenue for a more appropriate course of action, both for
producing and procuring municipalities. It includes fit-for-purpose incentives for cost
containment and productivity improvements in the production and consumption of jointly
used municipal services. It guides municipalities to be more accountable for their
investment decisions and encourages them to produce new information about the utilization




The new pricing model does not introduce new pricing methods per se. In that sense the
argumentative. However, the new pricing model is a new conceptual contribution to
theoretical discussions, namely how critical issues of the pricing problem of joint use
services between equal public law partners could be addressed. The new model is
instrumentalist only in the sense that it attempts to make the case for adoption of a fresh
approach to an established pricing doctrine. The implications of the new model are
increased use of municipal self-government, increased relevance of financial management,
incentives for cost efficiency, and more rigorous considerations for make-or-collaborate
and prudential investment decisions.
CONCLUSION
The regulation of public procurements has provided no rigorous definition
as a legal concept but procurement rules are increasingly applied to inter-municipal
contracting in seeking open and transparent competition. In this way, the procurement
legislation overlaps other fields of public law and limits municipal self-
ability to make autonomous pricing decisions in cases of joint use of municipal services.
The valid legal statutes and legal praxis do not reflect the political economy and the
regional, historical or logistical context within which the local policy-making and practices
of inter-municipal co-operation take place.
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ECJ rulings allow municipalities to sign exclusive closed inter-municipal contracts
provided they ensure fulfilment of a public duty of the contracting parties, exclude private
capital, are based on genuine cooperation with the public interest in mind, and the contract
implies no profits. The last point is the full cost principle  at least as interpreted in Finnish
legal case practices. Because the full cost principle does not specifically encourage cost
efficiency and productivity improvements, this study developed its new pricing model. It is
new compared with both the EU regulatory regime in general and the Finnish context in
particular and it provides wider, more risk and incentive aware and fit-for-context pricing
approaches.
It is difficult to see the new pricing model causing problems in respect of the ESM or
commercial interests if all the other criteria hold. The full cost doctrine represents a
formalistic -size-fits-  regulatory orientation, meaning that a municipality cannot
sign a lucrative inter-municipal contract in any circumstances. The new pricing model
developed in this paper would not change the fundamental nature of municipalities as
balanced-budget bodies or make them resemble profit-seeking organizations. What that
model does do is guide lawmakers and courts to take into consideration the specific nature
and context of each municipal joint use contract and so consider the appropriateness of the
application of different prices in different situations.
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